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Abstract
Comparing the treatment of Islamic veils and Christian crucifixes by the European
Court of Human Rights, this paper re-examines the charge of “double standards” on
the part of this guardian of the European legal order, which is seen as disadvantaging
Islam and favoring Christianity. While this is proved partially correct, the paper
calls for a more differentiated treatment of the issue. For one, there is a modicum of
consistency in the European Court’s decisions, because they are all meant to further
“pluralism”. Only, Islam and Christianity fare differently in this respect, as “threat”
to and “affirmation” of pluralism, respectively. This distinction hinges on Islam’s
compatibility with the liberal-secular order, on which the jury is out. A possible way out
of the “pluralism v. pluralism” dilemma, I argue, is signaled in the European Court’s
recent decision in Lautsi v. Italy (2011), which pairs a preference for “culturalized”
Christianity with robust minority pluralism.
Keywords: secularism; religion; liberalism; sociology of law; Islam; Christianity;
Europe.
O N B O T H S I D E S O F T H E A T L A N T I C , the role of religious
symbols in the public sphere has become subject to protracted
conflict. This is one way in which “public religion” has had a mighty
comeback, if it ever was out (see Casanova 1994). Veils and crucifixes are
of particular salience, both having been dealt with in legislation and legal
rulings by national high courts and the European Court of Human
Rights, the apex of the European human rights order. This coincidence
shows that majority and minority religions are equally involved in today’s
religious symbol struggles, though in different ways that still await
a more complete understanding.
The socio-legal literature tends to deplore a double standard in
the legal processing of majority and minority religious symbols,
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particularly visible in the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR): toward Christianity an accommodative stance of
“liberal pluralism” prevails, whereas toward Islam a restrictive stance of
“liberal antipluralism” is dominant (Danchin 2011, p. 706). In a kindred
vein, Susanna Mancini (2009, p. 2631) found that “courts and legislators
tend to secularize the meaning of religious symbols and interpret them
according to the sensitivities [.] of the majority”. But “secularization”
cuts in opposite, discriminatory ways: the crucifix is culturalized,
whereby the state makes it a symbol of national identity; and the veil
is politicized as a threat to the secular order, which now allows it to be
excluded. This leads to her conclusion that “secularized religion and
secularism are used in order to exclude the other and protect the
culturally homogenous character of European societies” (ibid.).
Whatever the thrust of the critique, pushing either the “double
standard” or the “secularism-is-discriminatory” line, which in effect
amounts to the same, the underlying assumption is that minority and
majority religions should be treated equally on the part of the state. As
such, this is an astonishing claim, if one considers the society- and
civilization-making powers of religion, which can never be the same in
any two places. In a way, it asks of state and society to abstract from
their particular history. It is a claim specific to “Latin Christendom”
(Taylor 2007) which invented secularism, that is, the separation of
state and religion, and the notional retreat of religion into a “private”
sphere. In one perspective, secularism and the privatization of religion
appear as the logical endpoint of religious evolution, in which religion
(qua its Christian incarnation) is finally revealed as what it is in essence:
a matter of subjective experience (Gauchet 1997). From another per-
spective, privatization is a most improbable outcome, as it sees in religion
the disguised power of the collectivity and thus attributes to religion
a necessarily social dimension (Durkheim 1984). Whatever perspective
on religion one takes, as subjective experience (Gauchet) or as social fact
(Durkheim), one could argue that the equality claim, which asks for all
religions to be treated equally by the state, is a trap that the liberal state
has set for itself: it can never be met in reality because of historically
grown, irredeemably particularistic religion-state relationships.1
Any comparison of the legal processing of veils and crucifixes, as
the most politically salient symbols of minority and majority religion,
respectively, must first consider that both are different things. The veil
as such is not imbued with religious meaning; it is not an object of
1 Throughout this paper, I use the notions
of religion-state relations and church-state
relations (or regimes) interchangeably, fol-
lowing much of the literature.
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veneration or cultic practice but merely functional to fulfilling the
Koranic obligation on the part of women to conceal their bodily attrac-
tions. In principle, this obligation could be met in any other way, for
instance, by putting on a helmet or slipping into a paper box. In contrast,
the crucifix is the religious symbol par excellence; it inherits the totem as
“typically holy thing” (Durkheim 1984, p. 166). As the veil qua veil is not
prescribed by religion, it is easy to attribute other than religious intentions
to it, and to dismiss it, for instance, as a political symbol that negates the
liberal-democratic order. Considering that the veil in itself is merely a
garment and fungible in the meanings attributed to it, it is easier to ex-
clude than the crucifix, whose cultic property makes it unquestionably
protected by the constitutional clauses for religious belief and practice in
the liberal state. Note, for instance, that the French 2010 law banning the
burqa is premised on the assumption, however implausible it may appear,
that the burqa is not a religious symbol prescribed by Islam but a symbol
of political fundamentalism (Joppke and Torpey 2013, chapter 2); the
headscarf prohibitions in some German L€ander, which explicitly exempt
the habits of Catholic nuns, follow the same line (Joppke 2009, chapter 3).
Such a complete (if tortuous) exorcizing of the religious dimension would
be difficult to imagine with respect to the crucifix.
Accordingly, the different (inherently religious v. fungible) contents
of crucifix and veil, respectively, make the veil in principle less legally
protected than the crucifix. However, this vulnerability is counterbal-
anced by a second attribute of the veil that now works in its favor: the veil
is always an attribute of the person wearing it, while the crucifix, to the
degree at least that it has become the object of legal contestation, is
mostly part of an institutional environment (especially schools), detached
from persons. So if the state excludes the veil for its allegedly political
implications, the veil-wearing woman may respond (in fact, she has
responded): “But it is my choice, the expression of my liberties, my
religious liberty and that is only for me and not for the state to define”.
Conversely, the crucifix if outside its cultic home ground, such as in
a public school or square, is an awkward thing for the liberal state to
protect, owing its name precisely to separating what it now sometimes
claims to be identifying with, if only in terms of history and culture.
In sum, the phenomenological and historical differences between
veil and crucifix and between the (minority v. majority) religions they
stand for must be acknowledged. In the spirit of not precipitately
buying into the “double standard” and “secularism-is-discriminatory”
charges but of tracing in detail where they apply and where perhaps
they go astray, the following pages revisit the main legal cases in
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Europe surrounding veil and crucifix, with a particular attention to the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This court was created by
the (non-EU) Council of Europe in 1953 to enforce the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that went into effect in the same
year. This most powerful of all international human rights courts in the
world, which gives individuals the right of standing, was meant to protect
and reinforce postwar Europe’s commitment to democracy and human
rights. Overall, this unique institution has fulfilled its designated function
admirably well, even if the initial 15 (by now 47) member states signing
up to it did so in the belief that the Court would “refrain from active
judicial intervention in domestic affairs” (Koenig, forthcoming, p. 8).
However, as Matthias Koenig (forthcoming) argues, the ECtHR
eventually stripped this limitation and evolved into a force of “in-
stitutional secularization” (p. 3), putting brakes on the historical priv-
ileges that majority religions inevitably enjoy in European (as in all)
societies. In this sense it acts as a significant equalizer between majority
and minority religions (ibid., p. 31). Still, the ECtHR has never been as
aggressive in this respect as national-level constitutional courts, and its
persistent eagerness not to offend its political overlords is expressed in
the Court’s notorious “margin of appreciation” doctrine that leaves
sensitive questions of national culture, identity, and religion-state
relations to the discretion of member states (see ibid., p. 9).
While my opening considerations suggest a differentiated treatment of
veils and crucifixes, both factually and normatively, there is still one
common principle that is meant to be furthered by the ECtHR’s entire
religion file: “pluralism”. Only, as I shall argue, different notions of
pluralism undergird the Court’s Islam and Christianity decisions: as
norm to be defended from an assumed threat of Islam (I), and as reality
that is seen as affirmed by Christianity (II). The legitimacy for this
opposite linking of both religions to pluralism hinges on the question
whether Islam is, indeed, in tension with the liberal-secular order. This
question does not have to be answered as crudely as in the European
Court’s Islam decisions, but it must be allowed – particularly as it
is raised even by intra-Islamic critics (such as anthropologist Saba
Mahmood 2009). I argue that the pairing of a preference for a “cultural-
ized” Christian majority religion with a defense of minority pluralism in
the European Court’s 2011 Lautsi decision provides a possible way out of
the “pluralism v. pluralism” dilemma (III).
The scope of this paper is doubly limited. First, its data are legal
decisions, which seems unusual for a sociology paper. However, the
point is to bring across to a non-legal audience the importance of legal
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discourse and legal decision-making for accommodating religion in
the contemporary liberal state (for a more extended exercise focusing
on Islam, see Joppke and Torpey 2013). Second, I look at the
decisions of only one court, though the one that is central to Europe’s
human rights regime. However, as mentioned, the European Court of
Human Rights is less aggressive than national-level constitutional
courts, rarely sanctioning its political principals. This paper thus gives
a conservative picture of law that rarely blockades politics, much in
contrast to often more acidic and confrontational national-level
dynamics. I thus provide a partial, not a complete picture. But this
is the limitation of all scholarly exercise.
I. “Pluralism” against Islam
Three of the ECtHR’s major Islam cases dealt with the headscarf,
and all upheld national-level restrictions that were claimed to be in
violation of religious liberty rights guaranteed by the European human
rights convention. Central to religious freedom is Article 9, which
guarantees “the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”
(ECHR Art.9.1). In line with many liberal state constitutions, the
European convention not only protects the right to believe foro interno
but also the right to “manifest” one’s belief to the outside world. If
Islam, indeed, not unlike Judaism, puts a premium on “orthopraxy”,
the unity of belief and ritual, and thus cannot really be privatized
(as claimed, for instance, by Mahmood 2012, XV), this feature of
Islam is thus in principle protected under the European convention.
Moreover, the European Human Rights Court has never questioned
that the Islamic veil, despite the veil’s intrinsic lack of religious signif-
icance, is a “manifestation” of religious belief, and thus falls under the
protection of ECHRArticle 9. The question was rather whether the right
to manifest one’s religion was cancelled out by a constraining condition
attached to Article 9, which concedes the possibility of “limitations” to
this right if they are “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a democratic
society” (ECHR Article 9.2). In this way, the expansive scope of
religious liberty protection under Article 9.1 was immediately revoked,
but only with respect to religious practice (not belief). This disadvan-
tages “orthopractical” religions that stress the unity of belief and ritual,
and seemingly confirms the “secularism-is-discriminatory” charge.
However, if one concedes the possibility of limits on the right to
religion, how could it be otherwise? How could they ever invade the
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inner sanctum of belief? Consider how the crucial “necessary-in-a-
democratic-society” limitation is spelled out, namely, in terms of
“public safety”, “protection of public order, health, or morals”, and
“protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. These limitations,
which implicitly invoke John Stuart Mill’s “harm principle” as
a benchmark for legitimate state intervention in a liberal society,
could impossibly pertain to individual belief, which in itself is socially
inconsequential; by necessity, any limitation must pertain to practice
that alone is socially relevant and thus on the state’s radar.
For good or bad, the European Court’s three major headscarf
decisions all upheld national-level restrictions as “necessary in a dem-
ocratic society”, relying on ECHR Article 9.2. The Court’s first
headscarf case, Dahlab v. Switzerland (2001)2, concerned a primary
school teacher in the Swiss canton of Geneva, a converted Catholic,
and as moderate and polite as Swiss Islam at large. Reviewing this
case, which was rejected up front as “manifestly ill-founded”, one is
tempted to concur with a legal critic’s view that an irrational “idea of
threat” underlies the ECtHR’s view of Islam (Evans 2006, p. 15).
There had never been any “complaints by parents or pupils” against the
veiled teacher, who explained her strange wear to her pupils not in
religious terms but as “sensitivity to the cold”.3 This was a rather thin
basis for reading into the scarf “some kind of proselytizing effect” that it
“might have” irrespective of its actual wearer’s expressly non-prosely-
tizing intentions. Moreover, as the Court added without much analysis,
the headscarf “appears to be imposed on women by a precept in the
Koran and [.] is hard to square with the principle of gender equality”.4
Hence the European Court’s conclusion, which closely followed the view
of the Swiss Federal Court, that the Islamic headscarf “appears difficult
to reconcile [.] with the message of tolerance, respect for others and,
above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a demo-
cratic society must convey to their pupils”.5
The irony of Dahlab, as of the European Court’s subsequent
headscarf and Islam cases also, is that the opposite of “tolerance”,
a prohibition, is justified in reference to “tolerance”. Overall, the
furthering of “pluralism” has been the central justification of the Court’s
restrictive line toward Islam, providing a semblance of coherence
with the Court’s rather lenient approach to cases involving Christianity
(see section II), which was also framed in terms of “pluralism”.
2 ECtHR, Dahlab v. Switzerland (2001),
App.no. 42393/98.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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“Pluralism” as “indissociable from a democratic society” had been
central to the Court’s first adjudication ever of an Article 9 violation
by a convention state, in Kokkinakis v. Greece (1993), and it has been
evoked ever since as the “main model of the Court’s case law related to
freedom of religion and the core principle which organizes Church-State
relations” (Tulkens 2009, pp. 2578f). Only, if applied to Islam, “plural-
ism” was not meant to endorse but to restrict religious practice, following
the model of “militant democracy” (Loewenstein 1937) that is assertive
of democratic values and principles against presumed enemies of de-
mocracy. (For a defense of “militant democracy” in religious matters, see
Finnis 2008; for an indictment, see Macklem 2010.)
However, there are two elements in Dahlab that cannot be reduced
to the militant democracy motif and thus are not liable to the charge of
chasing a phantom “threat”. The first is the fact that Dahlab
concerned a civil servant who “represented the state” and was thus
“bound by a special relationship of subordination to the public
authorities” and the principles under which these authorities oper-
ated, that is, “denominational neutrality” and the “separation of
Church and State”.6 This fact was interestingly ignored in the other
great headscarf case involving a public school teacher, the 2003 Ludin
decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which was in
favor of a veiled teacher and thus shows the greater inclusiveness of
national high courts toward Islam. Ludin makes a distinction between
“state” and “teacher”, the latter being foremost a person endowed
with the same religious freedoms as any individual. To this a dissent-
ing court minority objected that civil servants were due “temperance
and professional neutrality” (Joppke 2009, p. 69). Moreover, the Ludin
minority argued, the right of religious freedom (guaranteed by Article
4 of the German Basic Law), like all constitutional rights, was
a defensive right against the state intruding uninvited into a person’s
life. In contrast, a civil servant, by entering into an employment
contract with the state, sought “nearness” to the state, which is an
altogether different relationship to which constitutional rights do not
apply. It is still very much an open question whether public school
teachers are state functionaries much like police officers or judges,
exercising sovereign state functions and thus required to appear
“neutral” (symbolized by the requirement to wear uniforms), or
whether they exercise functions that could also be provided by the
market or other forms of non-political organization and thus are only
6 Ibid.
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contingently attached to the state and its neutrality obligation – note
that a uniform for teachers is not known anywhere today (see
B€ockenf€orde 2001).
A second element in Dahlab that cannot be construed as specifically
anti-Islamic is that it invoked the strict laicism in place in the French-
speaking canton of Geneva, where it is prohibited to deploy crucifixes
in state schools. Then, indeed, it would be strange to “allow the
teachers themselves to wear powerful religious symbols of whatever
denomination”.7
However, “militant democracy” is unambiguously central to the
European Court of Human Right’s second great Islam case, Refah
Partisi and Others v. Turkey.8 It affirmed the Turkish Constitutional
Court’s spectacular prohibition of the Islamic “Welfare Party”, then
the largest political party in Turkey forming a coalition government
with the leading centre-right True Path Party (headed by Minister
President Tansu Cxiller). While not a headscarf decision, Refah Partisi
matters in bringing out more clearly than the Court’s other Islam cases
the themes of “militant democracy” and defense of “pluralism” that
undergirded the Court’s approach to Islam. As the Court invoked the
“militant democracy” motif (without, however, using the word), “no one
must be authorized to rely on the Convention’s provisions in order to
weaken or destroy the ideals and values of a democratic society”.9 The
case is also noteworthy for following the Turkish Constitutional Court’s
reasoning at length, under the mantle of the “margin of appreciation”
doctrine. So the European Court cites, without an element of distancing
itself, the debatable statement that “Democracy is the antithesis of sharia
[.] With adherence to the principle of secularism, values based on reason
and science replaced dogmatic values” (emphasis supplied).10 This was
unwittingly saying that Turkey was not a democracy, but the rule of one
dogma (that of “reason and science”) replacing that of another dogma (that
of religion or “sharia”). Moreover, the European Court simply adopted
the Turkish Court’s indictment of Refah’s aim to establish a “plurality of
legal systems”, which was “to establish a distinction between citizens on
the ground of their religion and beliefs”, andwhich was assumed to be but
a first step toward the “installation of a theocratic regime”.11
Refah mobilized “pluralism” against “pluralism”, and thus was
indicative of the European Court’s general stand on Islam. This was
7 Ibid.
8 ECtHR, Case of Refah Partisi (The
Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, decision
of 13 February 2003.
9 Ibid., par.99.
10 Ibid., par.40.
11 Ibid., par.28.
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doubly ironic, as the Turkish militant laicism, which trumps even the
French in its dogmatic fervor, could hardly be called “pluralistic”, and
as the Islamic Welfare Party’s indicted project had precisely been the
introduction of pluralism to family law and private law.12 Such legal
pluralism, the Court argued, “would do away with the state’s role as
the guarantor of individual rights and freedoms”, and subject people
to the “static rules of law imposed by the religion concerned”.13 In
particular, subjecting Turkey’s Muslim citizens to the rules of sharia
was deemed problematic, as the latter was “stable and invariable.
Principles such as pluralism in the political sphere or the constant
evolution of public freedom have no place in it”.14
A judge concurring with the Court’s majority opinion in Refah still
criticized the “unmodulated” view of the Court “as regards the
extremely sensitive issues raised by religion and its values”, and that
it “missed the opportunity to analyse in more detail the concept of
a plurality of legal systems, which is [.] well established in ancient
and modern legal theory and practice”.15 The Court’s rejection of
legal pluralism also rested on a narrow understanding of religion as
“belief” decoupled from “practice”, undercutting the scope of Article
9 protections that included the freedom to “manifest” religion:
“(F)reedom of religion [.] is primarily a matter of individual con-
science and [.] the sphere of individual conscience is quite different
from the field of private law, which concerns the organization and
functioning of society as a whole”16. This is grist to the “secularism-
is-discriminatory” mill, the argument that European (and Western)
public institutions are simply deaf to religions that require a unity of
belief and ritual (e.g., Mahmood 2006, 2009, 2012).
But how can Refah’s explicit attack on “legal pluralism” still be
“pluralistic”? It can, if the latter is understood as in liberal political
science. Indeed, as one legal observer pointed out, the concept of
pluralism undergirding the case law of the ECtHR has a “certain
affinity with pluralism in political science” (Nieuwenhuis 2007, p.
377), which stipulates multiple memberships for each individual on
the basis of cross-cutting cleavages. It is thus exactly opposed to legal
pluralism’s notion of different legal orders for different groups.17
Pluralism thus understood, indeed, is “different from the existence of
12 “When we are in power a Muslim will
be able to get married before the mufti, if he
wishes, and a Christian will be able to marry
in church , if he prefers” (Refah leader
Erbakan, quoted in ibid., par.28).
13 Ibid., par.119.
14 Ibid., par.124.
15 Concurring opinion of Judge Kovler, in
ibid.
16 Ibid., par.128.
17 For a similar pluralist attack on group-
reifying multiculturalism, see Sartori (2001).
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separate societies” (ibid., p. 383). Only, to repeat, “Turkey” was
a strange soldier to enlist in its defense.
The European Court of Human Right’s third great Islam case,
Sahin v. Turkey (2006)18, was again a headscarf case, but this time not
brought forward by state employees but by university students. No
country in Europe knows anything similar to the Turkish headscarf
ban on university students that was affirmed by the Court’s Great
Chamber (its highest instance) in Sahin, not even France, where the
2004 headscarf law only concerned public schools, not universities.
Compared to the European Court’s first headscarf decision in Dahlab,
the emphasis shifted in Sahin from the defense of the “rights of
others” (in that case immature school children possibly subject to
“proselytism”) to the defense of “secularism”, on the one hand, and of
“gender equality”, on the other. This meant stressing the element of
“protection of public order” and of “morals” among the things held
“necessary in a democratic society”, as stipulated in ECHR Article
9.2. As the Court argued, “[i]n democratic societies in which several
religions coexisted within one and the same population, it might be
necessary to place restrictions on the freedom to manifest one’s
religion or belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various
groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs were respected”.19
But Sahin is less noteworthy from the point of view of legal doctrine,
which squarely followed the tracks laid out in Dahlab and Refah Partisi,
than for a spirited minority dissent by Belgian Justice Francxoise Tulkens.
She questioned whether this restriction of religious freedom was really
“necessary in a democratic society”, and raised doubts about the Court’s
entire handling of the Islam challenge to secularism.20 The fact that no
other European convention state but Turkey had banned the headscarf
for university students, educated adult citizens capable of choice, should
pose a limit to the usual “margin of appreciation” doctrine habitually
invoked in Sahin, which again simply followed the line of national
authorities and national courts: “European supervision”, which notion-
ally limits the “margin of appreciation” of states, “seems quite simply to
be absent from the judgment”.21 More concretely, Justice Tulkens
questioned the two justifications of the headscarf restriction, via secu-
larism and equality. With respect to secularism, are mere “worries or
18 ECtHR, Sahin v. Turkey [2006] ELR 73.
19 Ibid., par.106 (quoting the pluralism doc-
trine first developed in Kokkinakis v. Greece
[1993]).
20 Dissenting opinion by Judge Tulkens,
ibid.
21 Judge Tulkens, ibid., par.3.
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fears”, in particular the reference to “extremist political movements
within Turkey”22, sufficient reason to restrict a fundamental individual
freedom?23 “Merely wearing the headscarf cannot be associated with
fundamentalism”, Tulkens objected.24 In particular, she objected to the
Court’s disregard of the student’s expressed view not to oppose
secularism, and to the fact that no evidence was provided that she had
violated that principle. Last but not least, in an attempt to distinguish
Sahin from Dahlab, “the position of pupils and teachers seems to me to
be different”.25 There was no need in Sahin to protect unformed souls
from proselytism. Nor did a representative of the state obstruct her
obligatory neutrality through religious dress.
With respect to the second justification of the headscarf ban in
Sahin, via equality, Justice Tulkens quoted the German Constitu-
tional Court decision in Ludin (2003), which had argued, with the help
of sociologist Nil€ufer G€ole’s (1997) ethnography of the 1990s headscarf
movement at Turkish universities, that there was “no single meaning” to
the headscarf, least one that necessarily denigrated women. “What is
lacking in this debate is the opinion of women”, and the student’s
headscarf in particular was more likely to be “freely chosen” than
imposed by an archaic male milieu.26 But more importantly still, the
objective notion of equality deployed by the Court was “paternalistic”.
Properly understood, equality and non-discrimination are “subjective
rights which must remain under the control of those who are entitled to
benefit from them”.27 If it were otherwise, one could impossibly stop at
prohibiting the headscarf in school, university, or courtroom, and there
would be a “positive obligation” for the state to sniff out and prohibit it
wherever it could be found, be it in citizens’ bedrooms.28
The last European headscarf case to date involved the mother of all
European headscarf controversies: France. Dogru v. France (2008)29
also gave the final European d’accord to France’s 2004 Law on Laicity,
which prohibited “ostentatious religious symbols” in French public
schools, on the part of pupils, putting to a (preliminary) end the
notorious affaires de foulard that had been ongoing for some 15 years.
The case concerned an 11-year old girl who insisted on wearing a scarf
during physical education classes, back in 1999. She was subsequently
expelled from school for “breach of assiduity”, that is, her lack of
22 Sahin, par.115.
23 Judge Tulkens, ibid., par.5.
24 Judge Tulkens, ibid., par.10.
25 Judge Tulkens, ibid., par.8.
26 Judge Tulkens, ibid., par.11.
27 Judge Tulkens, ibid., par.12.
28 Judge Tulkens, ibid.
29 ECtHR, Case of Dogru v. France (appli-
cation no. 27058/05), 4 December 2008.
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compliance with the existing health and safety rules. The exclusion of
the headscarf from physical education and sports classes had been
affirmed by the Conseil d’Etat, France’s administrative high court, in
March 1995. Two aspects of this case are noteworthy. First, it dealt with
an apparently radical (parent) claimant, who pushed the Koranic veiling
obligation to the limit of the puberty threshold. Moreover, the parents
refused a compromise offered by the school, which was to allow the
headscarf during regular school hours, and to limit the prohibition to
physical education: “we’re going to win” they said,30 and the case was on.
It is not implausible to argue, on the part of the French government, that
the ensuing conflict had generated a “general atmosphere of tension in the
school”. Secondly, headscarves were generally tolerated in French schools
at the time, unless their motivation was to proselytize. However, this
tolerance had never applied to physical education, especially swimming
lessons, on which French courts (unlike other European courts; see Albers
1994) had always taken a hard, non-accommodating line.
The Court fully sided with the French government, which had
defended the expulsion of the girl from school as “necessary in a
democratic society” along the lines of Sahin, that is, for the sake of
“secularism” and “gender equality”. As the Court argued, with an eye
on the regional origins of its previous headscarf cases: “[I]n France, as
in Turkey or Switzerland, secularism is a constitutional principle, and
a founding principle of the Republic, to which the entire population
adheres [.] [A]n attitude which fails to respect that principle will not
necessarily be accepted as being covered by the freedom to manifest
one’s religion”.31 And this was again a case of mobilizing “pluralism”
against “pluralism”: “pluralism and democracy must be based on
dialogue and a spirit of compromise”, argued the Court, and this
required the repression of religious pluralism, that is, “various conces-
sions on the part of individuals [.] to maintain and promote the ideals
and values of a democratic society”.32
Reviewing the European Court of Human Rights’ entire religion
file, Matthias Koenig observed an “evolving jurisprudence” that “has
opened avenues for religious minorities to claim their equal rights”
(Koenig, forthcoming, p. 31). Perhaps an example of a mellowing attitude
toward Islam is Affaire Ahmet Arslan et Autres c. Turque (2010)33, which
is one of the first where the reference to “secularism” and the exigencies
of “militant democracy” did not trump Muslims’ religious liberty right
30 Ibid., par.39.
31 Ibid., par.72.
32 Ibid., par.62.
33 ECtHR, Affaire Ahmet Arslan et Autres
c. Turque, Requete no. 41135/98, 23 February
2010.
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under Article 9 of ECHR. It concerned a small Islamic sect, Aczimendi
Tarikaty, members of which were arrested, in October 1996, for parading
in front of their mosque in Ankara in their black religious attire including
turban, tunic and stick, which was modeled on that of the Prophet. In
January 1997, participating sect members were charged and indicted for
violating Turkish secularism laws that proscribe the wearing of headgear
and of religious garments in public other than for religious ceremonies.
Notably chaired by Belgian Justice Francxoise Tulkens, who had issued
the spirited minority dissent in Sahin v. Turkey, the Court’s second
section first distinguished this case fromDahlab, in that the case involved
“simple citizens” and “not representatives of the state in exercise of a
public function”34. Most importantly, however, it distinguished the case
from Sahin, in that this was not the case of a dress restriction in a public
institution where a neutrality obligation applied, but a case where the
plaintiffs “were sanctioned for their way of dressing in public spaces open
to all like streets or public places”.35 Further considering that in the case
in question there had been “no threat to public order”36 and that there
had been “no proselytism”, the movement being a “mere ‘curiosity’”37
not recognized by official Islam in Turkey, the Court held that punishing
the sect members constituted an infraction of religious liberty under
Article 9 ECHR.
Whereas Dogru v. France (2008) had affirmed France’s 2004 law
against the foulard in public schools, Arslan v. Turkey (2010) could
create problems for the French burqa law passed in July 2010. This
law prohibits the “dissimulation” of one’s face in all public places, in
order to safeguard the “reciprocity” of seeing and being seen that is
held to be elementary for social life (see Joppke and Torpey 2013,
chapter 2). If “ordinary citizens” “dressing in public space open to all
like streets or public places”, with the “sole aim” of manifesting their
religion, could not be easily restricted by the state, as was held in
Arslan, the Court should consequently also find fault with the French
burqa law that does just that, namely, restrict the elementary religious
liberties of “ordinary citizens” in “public places”.
II. .and “pluralism” for Christianity
In his review of European high court rules on religion, in which the
European Court of Human Rights figures prominently, Ran Hirschl
(2010, p. 162) indicts these courts’ “inclination toward secularism and
34 Ibid., par.48.
35 Ibid., par.49.
36 Ibid., par.50.
37 Ibid., par.51.
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modernism”.While this is a fair description of the ECtHR’s overall stance
on Islam, it curiously ignores a second, muchmore accommodative, stance
that the same Court has taken toward the Christian majority religion,
including some of its more debatable, sectarian offshoots (such as the
notoriously court-going Jehovah’s Witnesses). As the crucifix appeared on
the Court’s agenda only late, in the famous Lautsi case adjudicated in 2009
and 2011, we must first address the key Christianity cases that preceded it.
The spirit for the defense of religious pluralism when under the
(broadly) Christian umbrella was set in the Court’s very first finding
of a religious liberty violation under Article 9, in Kokkinakis v. Greece
(1993).38 The case concerned a rather hilarious event of proselytism
by a married couple of Jehovah’s Witnesses, who had first telephoned
the wife of an Orthodox priest and then entered her house on a pretext,
“telling her about the politician Olof Palme and [.] expounding
pacifist views”.39 Based on a clause in the Greek Constitution that
prohibits proselytism, the couple was arrested and sentenced to four
months in prison – in fact, the husband had been arrested in the past
more than sixty times for similar acts. This was a delicate case in a state
symbiotically aligned with the Orthodox Church, and the plaintiff not
unreasonably charged that “even the wildest academic hypothesis”40
could not imagine a charge of proselytism ever being raised against
members of the Orthodox Church.41 Further, Mr. Kokkinakis claimed
that the ban on proselytism was unconstitutional, as no line could be
drawn between proselytism and the freedom of religion.
In siding with Kokkinakis, the European Court indeed “upheld
a secularist view of the state” (Dembour 2000, pp. 201f), but now as
one in which the involved (Greek) state did not live up to this ideal,
and was asked not to interfere in religious practices in society. This
was the moment that the Court introduced its central doctrine for all
its religion cases: that the purpose of protecting religious freedoms
under ECHR Article 9 was to further “the pluralism indissociable
from a democratic society”42. Only now, that Christian groups stood
to be protected, “pluralism” worked in favor of and not against the
involved religion. More than that, pluralism worked in favor not only
of religious beliefs but practices, that is, of religion expansively
defined, including attempts to convert others to the “truth”. This
38 ECtHR, Kokkinakis v. Greece, decision
of 25 May 1993.
39 Ibid., B.10.
40 Ibid., par.15.
41 In fact, before a constitutional amend-
ment in 1975 the Greek constitution only
prohibited proselytism on the part of non-
Orthodox religions.
42 Ibid., par.31.
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is precisely what had been denied to Islam, some of whose practices
(or “manifestations” of belief) had been restricted as “necessary in
a democratic society”. As the Court argued in Kokkinakis, “[b]earing
witness in words and deeds is bound up with the existence of religious
convictions”.43 Moreover, a distinction had to be drawn between
“bearing Christian witness”, with which the Court alleged to be dealing
here, and “improper proselytism”. If one compares the accommodating
line taken in this rather drastic case of proselytism, eulogized as “bearing
Christian witness”, with the categorical rejection of even the vaguest (and
factually unconfirmed) possibility of proselytism in Dahlab, one cannot
but notice a double standard at work, that is, laxness for Christianity and
an unforgiving stance toward Islam.
An equally strong ground for the double standard charge was
provided just one year later by the famous case Otto-Preminger-
Institut v. Austria (1994).44 Here the European Court protected the
Christian majority of the Austrian Land of Tyrol from attack by
a “blasphemic” work of art, and no problem was found with a drastic
case of censorship on the part of the Austrian government, which had
annulled the artist’s right to freedom of expression, guaranteed in
ECHR Article 10. The casus belli was the film Das Liebeskonzil by
Werner Schroeter, a well-known German filmmaker, in which “God
the Father is presented [.] as a senile, impotent idiot, Christ as
a cretin and Mary Mother of God as a wanton lady.”45 The Court
argued that this case required the “weighing up” of two “fundamental
freedoms”, the right to “freedom of expression”, under ECHR Article
10.1., on the one hand, and the “right of other persons to proper
respect for their freedom of thought, conscience and religion”, under
ECHR Article 9.1., on the other.46 Invoking the Court’s trademark
“margin of appreciation” doctrine, this “weighing up” turned out to
be decidedly one-sided.
Noteworthy in Otto Preminger is the European Court’s construing
of Article 9 as guaranteeing “respect for the religious feelings of
believers”.47 As three dissenting judges sharply remarked, “the
Convention does not [.] guarantee a right to protection of religious
feelings. More particularly, such a right cannot be derived from the
right to freedom of religion, which in effect includes a right to express
views critical of the religious opinion of others”.48 Indeed, the “spirit
43 Ibid., par.31.
44 ECtHR, Case of Otto-Preminger-Institut
v. Austria, decision of 20 September 1994.
45 Ibid., par.16.
46 Ibid., par.55.
47 Ibid., par.47.
48 Opinion of three dissenting judges,
ibid., par.6.
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of tolerance” that the Court majority found “maliciously violated” by
the incensed film,49 was exactly hollowed out by lowering the threshold
of legally allowed expression to being “in accordance with accepted
opinion”.50 Because then there was no point for tolerance, which requires
the moral repugnance of the tolerated. Comparing Otto Preminger with
Sahin, one must conclude, with Justice Tulkins’ dissent in Sahin, that
religious sentimentwas “perhaps overprotect[ed]”, while religious practice
received only a “subsidiary form of protection”.51
In addition to an “overprotective” reading of religious beliefs,
when justifying the “margin of appreciation” on the part of the
Austrian government, the Court in Otto Preminger also interpreted the
“public order” proviso that might justify restricting a fundamental
freedom (here: of artistic expression) in rather different terms than in
the Islamic headscarf cases: not in reference to protecting “secular”
enlightenment values like equality but to protecting “social peace” (see
Danchin 2011, p. 728). Thus the Court found one “cannot disregard the
fact that the Roman Catholic religion is the religion of the overwhelming
majority of Tyroleans. In seizing the film, the Austrian authorities acted
to ensure religious peace in that region”. This was a majoritarian,
realpolitisch argument, to be decided on empirical rather than principled
grounds. It may still have been wrong, but it was different in kind from
the debatable re-interpretation of religious liberty rights.
Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, quickly followed by a very
similar blasphemy verdict to protect Christian majority sentiment in
Wingrove v. United Kingdom52, became a polemical cause celebre
when, first, the Rushdie affair and, later, the Danish cartoon conflict
had European Muslims up in the streets for the censoring of artistic
and media productions – as we know, both times in vain. Particularly
drastic is the contrast with the British case of Choudhury, where
British courts rejected a Muslim claim to prohibit Rushdie’s Satanic
Verses by extending coverage of the British blasphemy law to the
Islamic faith: just a few weeks before the ECtHR accepted to hear the
Preminger case, the Court declared Choudhury as inadmissible. As the
Court argued, Article 9 ECHR does not “extend to a right to bring
[.] proceedings against those who [.] offend the sensitivities of an
individual or a group of individuals” (quoted in Dembour 2000, p. 220).
Who would disagree with Sussex lawyer Marie Dembour (ibid.) that
49 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, a.a.
o., par.47.
50 Opinion of three dissenting judges,
ibid., par.3.
51 Sahin v. Turkey, a.a.o., dissenting opin-
ion by Judge Tulkens, par.3.
52 ECtHR,Wingrove v. the United Kingdom,
decision of 25 November 1996.
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such unequal treatment “illustrates the difficulty that non-Christians
encounter in having their religious feelings recognized in the implicitly
Christian culture of the Council of Europe”?
Similarly, the refusal to censor the Danish cartoons, which had
ridiculed the Prophet, evoked the very different treatment of such a
claim, when raised by Christians, in Otto Preminger. For Saba Mahmood
(2009), it showed that a preference for majority culture is a “constitutive
assumption of free-speech law of Europe” (p. 860), and that it was
pointless for European Muslims to expect justice from secular laws that
had “ineluctable sensitivity to majoritarian cultural sensibilities” built
into them (p. 851). Robert Post (2007), in a robust defense of the Danish
cartoons as expression of the public debate that is necessary for dem-
ocratic legitimation, reads an interesting rejection of the “style” (rather
than substance) of speech into the European Court’s censorships inOtto-
Preminger-Institut and Wingrove, according to which this speech was
“gratuitously offensive to others” and “not contribut(ing) to [.] public
debate capable of furthering progress in human affairs” (p. 80). He crit-
icizes European states for being “more normatively hegemonic than
America”, whereby the “ensur(ing) (of) social peace” trumps “demo-
cratic legitimation” (p. 82). Despite her loud disagreement with Post’s
defense of free speech, this was not far from Saba Mahmood’s allegation
that the public sphere is not neutral but a “disciplinary space that inhibits
certain kinds of speech while enabling others” (2007, p. 2).
Matthias Koenig (forthcoming) interestingly argued that, after
gaining more autonomy due to structural reforms in the mid- to late
1990s53, the European Court of Human Rights took on a more daring
“counter-majoritarian” stance (p. 24), contributing to the “seculari-
zation of European nation-states” (p. 26). An interesting case in this
respect is Folgero and Others v. Norway (2007)54, which can be read in
either (orthodox or heterodox) direction. On the one hand, the Court
found in accordance with the “principles of pluralism”55 an obligatory
“Christianity, Religion and Philosophy” course in Norwegian state
schools that “gives priority to tenets of Christianity over other
religions and philosophies of life”56, in recognition of the fact that
the Evangelical Lutheran religion is the “official religion” of the state.
On the other hand, the Court majority declared as violation of the
53 In 1994, individuals gained direct legal
access to the European court, and in 1998
states were compelled to accept individual
complaint procedures (see Koenig, forth-
coming: 10).
54 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Fol-
gero and Others v. Norway, decision of 29
June 2007.
55 Ibid., par.39.
56 Ibid., par.17.
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parents’ right of education (guaranteed by Article 2 of ECHR) a refusal
by the Norwegian authorities to grant a full exemption to the children of
atheists, which it deemedwarranted because the curriculum had not been
taught “in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner”.57 In particular,
a fine distinction in Norway’s contested religious curriculum between
disseminating knowledge, which was mandatory, and instilling religious
norms, which was not allowed, had not worked out as foreseen, and the
need for providing “reasonable grounds” for a full exemption had created
a “risk that the parents might feel compelled to disclose to the school
authorities intimate aspects of their own religious and philosophical
convictions”.58 Though achieved only with the smallest possible (9:8)
court majority, this was a sensitive decision that seemed a blow to the
“selective privileges for religious majorities” that had prevailed pre-
viously (Koenig 2012, p. 31).
The new tendency toward imposing secularism also on the
Christian majority religion seemed at first vindicated by the European
Court of Human Rights’ first Lautsi decision (2009), whereby we finally
arrive at the issue of crucifixes. Lautsi I prohibited the display of
Christian crosses in Italian public schools.59 Comparing this spectacular
decision with the almost simultaneous US Supreme Court’s okay to
a cross on public land qua rendering it into a “war memorial”60, an
American legal observer even deemed Europe and the US to be moving
in opposite directions vis-a-vis their respective traditions, toward state-
level secularism in Europe and toward state-level Christianism in the US
(Witte and Arold 2011). Lautsi I declared the mandatory cross in Italian
public schools “incompatible with the State’s duty to respect neutrality in
the exercise of public authority”61 and an infringement on the (negative)
religious rights of pupils and of the education rights of parents. It
followed a secularist path carved out by the German Constitutional
Court’s quite similar Crucifix decision of 1995. In addition, the Italian
civil courts, up to the Court of Cassation, had previously found the
crucifix in public schools incompatible with laicita (Pin 2011, p. 124).
Conversely, Lautsi I, which was not by accident issued under the
progressive Francxoise Tulkens as Court president (our lonely dissenter in
Sahin), corrected a curious tilt toward “confessional secularism” (Man-
cini 2006, p. 187) that had taken hold in Italy’s administrative courts, up
57 Ibid., par.43.
58 Ibid. par.98.
59 ECtHR (2nd section), Case of Lautsi v.
Italy (application no. 30814/06), decision of 3
November 2009; henceforth referred to as
Lautsi I.
60 Supreme Court (United States), Sala-
zar, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v. Buono
(no.08-472), decision of 28 April 2010.
61 Lautsi I, par.57.
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to the highest level. These courts had all argued that the creedal
universalism inherent in Christianity made privileges for the latter not
just opportune but mandatory because the “liberal” and “secular” state
had to be cognizant of its historical roots. In doing so, Italy’s adminis-
trative courts had gone to bizarre lengths to act as “de facto theologians”,
as Mahmood would put it (2006, pp. 326f). In a nutshell, the argument
went that only Christianity had generated liberty and secularism, so one
could – even had to – be partial for it. According to this logic, even India
should offer pride of public space to the Christian crucifix. And it
allowed an insidious comparison with “lesser” religions that could and
should be excluded. Among the many mental pirouettes along this line,
not the least acrobatic is the following: Christianity prized “charity”
above “faith”, thus being the only religion to include even “unbe-
lievers”.62 It is not difficult to read into this a dismissal of the one religion
that today is associated with placing “faith” above everything, including
respect for secular laws: Islam.
Like the German Constitutional Court’s famous Crucifix decision
of 1995, to which the pious Bavarian Prime Minister had responded
with a call for public insurrection, Lautsi I caused a political upheaval
in Italy. The Italian Prime Minister (better known for bunga-bunga)
found the judgment “not acceptable for us Italians” (Mancini 2010,
p. 6), and indeed 84 percent of polled Italians disagreed with
Strasbourg’s crucifix ban (Pin 2011, p. 98). The most ferocious attack
was made by the Maltese Judge on the ECtHR, who denounced the
decision as “historical Alzheimer’s” and cried out that “[a] European
court should not be called upon to bankrupt centuries of European
tradition” and to “rob the Italians of part of their cultural personal-
ity”. Indeed, the consequence of Lautsi I was the “Americanisation”
of Europe63, as Joseph Weiler put it for eight Council of Europe states
siding with Italy in the appeal before the Court’s Great Chamber: an
American- (or French-) style “rigid separation of Church and State”
was imposed as “a single and unique rule”64, with potentially grave
consequences for the constitutionality of most church-state regimes in
Europe that had never known such separation.
When overturning Lautsi I in March 2011, the ECtHR’s Grand
Chamber held that a preference for majority religion reflected the
“history and tradition” of the respective state, and that this was no
62 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of
Lautsi and Others v. Italy (application no.
30814/06), decision of 18 March 2011
(henceforth referred to as Lautsi II) (quoting
the Italian Administrative Court, par.15).
63 Lautsi II, par.47.
64 Ibid.
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“departure from the principles of pluralism and objectivity” and did
not amount to “indoctrination”.65 Such preference could also work in
favor of Islam, if this happened to be the majority religion in a given
place (as it was, in Turkey).66 While conceding that the crucifix was
“above all a religious symbol”67, the Court in effect sided with the
Italian government, which had argued that the cross carried “not only
a religious connotation but also an identity-linked one”.68 When fixed
on a school wall, the meaning of the crucifix was above all cultural,
corresponding to a “tradition” that the state might consider “impor-
tant to perpetuate”. But to “perpetuate a tradition” was “within the
margin of appreciation of the respondent State”69 and not something
for a European Court to intervene in.
Further note that the lower chamber in Lautsi I had equated
crucifix and veil as “powerful external symbols” that could not but “be
interpreted by pupils of all ages as [.] religious sign(s)”70 and thus
required to be equally exorcised from the school environment for the
sake of “the educational pluralism which is essential for the preser-
vation of ‘democratic society’”71 (thus invoking the “pluralism”
lodestar of the ECtHR’s entire jurisdiction on religion). The Grand
Chamber explicitly rejected this equation between veil and crucifix,
and the crucifix, indicative of its implicit culturalization, now figured
above all as an “essentially passive symbol”, devoid of any indoctri-
nating or proselytizing intention.72 An interesting parallel to this
immunizing strategy can be found in the US Supreme Court’s
Salazar v. Buono decision of April 2010, according to which the
meaning of the crucifix was context-dependent, and that when meant
to “honor our Nation’s fallen soldiers” (as it purportedly did in this
case) it could not be taken as an “attempt to set the imprimatur of the
state on a particular creed”.73
However, as if sensing that the peculiar transformation of the crucifix
from religious into cultural symbol could not be driven too far, the Grand
Chamber’s crucial move in Lautsi II was not to endorse the viciously
exclusive universalization-of-Christianity line pursued by Italy’s
administrative courts. Instead, and in this following almost verbatim
the position of the Italian government in its June 2010 memoire for the
Grand Chamber hearing on this case, the main strategy was to defend
65 Ibid, par. 71. The reference here is to
Folgero.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., par.66.
68 Ibid., par.67.
69 Ibid., par.68.
70 Lautsi I, par.55.
71 Ibid., par.56.
72 Lautsi II, par.72.
73 SCUS, Salazar, Secretary of the Inte-
rior, et al. v. Buono, op.cit., at p.11 (opinion of
Justice Kennedy).
116
christian joppke
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975613000040
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 15:10:16, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
the crucifix in terms of religious pluralism. Considering the facts that
“Italy opens up the school environment in parallel to other religions”;
that “it was not forbidden for pupils to wear Islamic headscarves; that
the “beginning and end of Ramadan were ‘often celebrated’”; and that
optional religious education was available for “all recognized religious
creeds”74, it would indeed be an “absurdity” to remove the crucifix,
would it bear the odd consequence “that the religion of the great
majority of Italians is sacrificed and discriminated.”75
III. Beyond pluralism v. pluralism?
The European Court of Human Rights’ Lautsi II decision shows
a possible way out of the impasse reached in its religion file. As shown
in this comparison of its rather different decisions on Christianity and
on Islam, previously the Court had played out one variant of pluralism
against another, a “pluralism” of tolerance and of maximum respect
for religious sentiment in the case of Christians, against a “pluralism”
of militant secularism in the case of Muslims, some of whose religious
expressions stood to be repressed for the penultimate value to be
furthered by the European human rights convention, which is
“pluralism” (see Tulkens 2009). In this respect the conflict is one
between pluralism as fact, which is seen as established and guaranteed
under the Christian umbrella, and pluralism as norm to be protected,
in particular from an “Islam” that is perceived as a threat to it.
Lautsi II shows a way out of this impasse by pairing an inevitable
preference for majority religion as simple fact of “history and tradition”,
which can never be the same in any two places, with a commitment to
religious pluralism, especially toward Islam as Europe’s most important
minority religion (see Joppke 2013a). Interestingly, this will require
amodicumofmulticulturalismthat the samecourthadpreviouslydenied in
its Islam cases fromDahlab to Dogru, and which European governments
have notionally retreated from in recent years (see Joppke 2013b). If the
European Court takes Lautsi II by its word, it would have to reconsider
its militant secularism displayed toward Islam in the past and to take
a rather more genuinely pluralist line instead, as in fact first intimated in
its 2010 Arslan decision (see part I above). This is because the preference
for a culturalized Christian majority religion in Lautsi II is not based on
74 Lautsi II, par.74.
75 Foreign Ministry (Italy), Memoire du
gouvernement italien pour l‘audience devant
la Grand Chambre de la Cour Europeenne
des Droits de l’Homme (Reque^te no. 30814/
06 Lautsi c. Italie), 30 June 2010 (typescript
in author’s possession).
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its alleged universalistic merits that other religions fall short of, but on the
factual assumption that minority religions are not repressed in public
space, which would make an exclusion of the crucifix inconsistent.
The pluralism v. pluralism frame replicates the old tale of the two
liberalisms, an “enlightenment rationalism” that is militantly brought
forward against Islam, as against a “value pluralism” that is more gener-
ously displayed toward Christianity, for whom the religious liberty clause
under the European Convention on Human Rights has even been inter-
preted as the right to be free from religious injury (see Danchin 2011).
Perhaps it is correct to say that, historically speaking, the core of liber-
alism is not “justice” but “security” and “social peace” (see Geuss 2002),
so that “modern philosophical liberalism” does appear “disengaged from
the historical architecture of toleration and pluralism” (Hunter 2005, p. 2).
However, both liberalisms are still equally legitimate and even necessary,
because each would self-destruct without a bit of the other: enlightenment
rationalism without an element of pluralism would turn despotic and
illiberal; conversely, pluralism cannot be sustained without a liberal ethic
and a sufficient number of “liberals” subscribing to liberal values.
Both liberalisms thus have their time and place, and which one is
more apposite is not a question of principle but of circumstances. With
respect to religion and religionists, it very much depends on howmuch of
a threat to liberalism the respective religion is, and how large the number
of the people under its sway. Carolyn Evans, in a persuasive critique of
the European Court of Human Rights’ Islamic headscarf decisions,
found that these decisions rest on two contradictory images of Muslim
women, as “victim” (with respect to gender equality) and as “aggressor”
(with respect to presumed proselytism and intolerance), and she sees
both images united in the “idea of threat” (Evans 2006, p. 15). She leaves
it at that, assuming that the “idea of threat” is so obviously wrongheaded
as not to require any further discussion.
But perhaps Islam is a threat to liberal institutions, particularly if
sufficient numbers espouse an uncompromising variant of it. Oxford
jurist John Finnis (2008, p. 8) takes this line, alas without any
qualification. Finnis defends the European Court’s selective tough-
ness toward Islam in light of Islam’s “particular kind of religious
culture [...]: a disrespect for equality [.]; a denial of immunity from
coercion in religious matters [.] – the immunity now central to
Christian political teaching” (p. 12). Finnis even ponders “whether it
is prudent [.] to permit any further migratory increase of that pop-
ulation” (ibid.). The problemwith this view is the lack of any qualification.
Apart from drawing a one-sided, monolithic picture of Islam, it hugely
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exaggerates the demographic presence of Muslims in Europe, who by
2030 are expected to have a population share of no more than 7-8 percent
on average, with the exception of France and Germany (where the
percentage may become as high as 15-16 percent – but no more)
(Laurence 2012, p. 254). So no “Eurabia” is in the making. But the bend-
ing of minority faiths to the secularism that European (and all modern)
societies have come to cherish is not as such an illegitimate undertaking.
It has become de rigueur to stipulate “multiple secularisms”
(Stepan 2011), much as there are “multiple modernities” (Eisenstadt
2000). But underneath its undeniably plural forms there is a singular
core of secularism intrinsically tied to the nature of the modern
democratic state, which all religions, “old” and “new”, majority and
minority, have to respect. Charles Taylor (1998) grounded the necessity of
secularism in the historical transition from a hierarchical “society of
orders” to a “horizontal, direct access society” (p. 40), in which citizenship
marks a direct relationship to the state, without any group intermediation.
As all citizens equally partake in popular sovereignty, a “certain degree of
commitment” is required of them that ancien regime subjects were not
expected to hold. It amounts to a “patriotism” or “citizen identity” that
takes precedence over all other identities, ethnic, religious, etc. (p. 43). A
“communal identity” of an ethnic or religious kind now becomes
problematic because of its exclusiveness. In a democracy one can only
be a “member of the sovereign” or a “resident alien” (p. 47). Accordingly,
“(b)oth the sense of mutual bonding and the crucial reference points of
the political debate that flow from it have to be accessible to citizens of
different confessional allegiances, or of none” (p. 46). To this structural
element of democratic modernity Taylor adds a novel “social imaginary”
that knows no “higher” reality but only “common action in secular time”
(p. 40) (later famously dubbed “immanent frame”, see Taylor 2007).
While “secularism” understood in these dual terms has particular
“Christian roots” (p. 31), it is “not optional in the modern age” (Taylor
1998, p. 48) but applicable everywhere. Taylor thus insists not just on
secularism in the singular, but also on a group-transcending sense of
citizenship (“patriotism”) that must go with it.
The question of Islam’s fit with a secular frame thus defined does
not have to be answered as crudely as by the European Court of
Human Rights; but it is not as such illegitimate. All the more so as an
influential Muslim jurist stridently answered it in the negative: “For
Muslim societies, as Islam is a comprehensive system of worship [.]
and legislation, the acceptance of secularism means abandonment
of shari’a, a denial of divine guidance and a rejection of God’s
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injunctions [.] [T]he call for secularism among Muslims is atheism
and a rejection of Islam” (Yusuf al-Qaradawi, quoted in March 2011,
p. 29). Among more academically minded commentators, and con-
sidering only those arguing from within the ambit of Islam, the jury
on Islam’s fit with a secular order is out. In an interesting exchange over
the wisdom of restricting religiously injurious speech in the so-called
Danish cartoon affair, Saba Mahmood (2009, p. 842) describes Islam as
in principle incompatible with secular principles. In her view, Islam
stipulates a relationship of bodily “attachment and cohabitation” with the
Prophet, requiring an orthopraxis of belief-cum-ritual that notoriously
stands to be offended by secular laws, for which religion is “ultimately
about belief in a set of propositions to which one gives one’s assent”
(p. 852). But then the law can never come to the rescue, because what
really is required is a “larger transformation of the cultural and ethical
sensibilities of the majority Judeo-Christian population” (p. 860).
Andrew March (2012) objected to this view that there is ritual and
emotion in Christianity also, and that “belief” is as central to Islam as to
any monotheism, if not more so, considering the “divine voluntarism” of
traditional Sunni Islam (that is akin in this respect to Puritan Protes-
tantism). Conversely, as March dryly turns the tables against Mahmood’s
notional anti-secularism, a depiction ofMuslims’ outrage over the Danish
cartoons in terms of bodily “hurt, loss, and injury” (Mahmood 2009,
p. 846) would amount to the “seculariz(ing)” of the Islamic discourse on
the sacred by transforming it into “emotional pain” (March 2012).
While Saba Mahmood may render Islam more exotic than it is,
Andrew March gives an erudite but rather sanitized version of it that
sidelines its illiberal edges. While March’s rather brilliant mastery of
arcane Islamic-Arabic sources is generally taken by a polite academic
audience to prove that even conservative Islamic thinking can warm
up to “liberal citizenship” (March 2009), it also shows the consider-
able acrobatics required to reach that result. In particular, March
invests much hope in a non-instrumentally understood da’wa (pros-
elytizing) as pushing Muslims toward an equal “recognition of non-
Muslims”. However, he also concedes that da’wa is not “discourse
ethics” because it “presumes the result and the norm sought before
contact with the other” (2009, p. 228). But if “reciprocity” is not the
default stance of da’wa, it is not clear how it could lead to the desired
result, a “positive relationship to fellow citizens” (ibid.).
Nagging incompatibilities with a secular order are much more
straightforwardly laid open in Abdullahi An-Naim’s celebrated plea
for an “Islamic reformation” (1990). It is premised on the assumption
120
christian joppke
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975613000040
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 15:10:16, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
that classic Islam, unlike other religions, requires an “identity of religion
and government” that is “indelibly stamped on the memories and
awareness of the faithful” (p. 3), and that the “nation-state”, cornerstone
of the international order, is a concept that is “difficult to assimilate and
implement” for “Muslim peoples” (p. 7). In particular, An-Naim depicts
“historical shari’a” as incompatible with international human rights law
in its discriminatory treatment of non-Muslims, women, Muslim
apostates and atheists; not to mention that at the international plane
shari’a amounts to a “theoretically permanent state of war between
Muslims and non-Muslims”, which “repudiates the entire basis of
modern international law” (p. 150). From a non-Islamic pen such blunt
lines would be immediately denounced as “Orientalist” or worse.
Of course, these theoretical debates, which we could only touch on
here, are far from the mundane concerns of ordinary Muslim folk,
who rightly insist on their religious liberty rights like any other
religionist in the liberal state. And, as we showed, doubts about
Islam’s compatibility with secularism are in a panicky fashion turned
into an argument for restricting the religious rights of Muslims, while
most others, however nutty, go free. In this sense Susanna Mancini
(2009, p. 2664) is right to complain that “disproportionate weapons
are assembled” against materially deprived Muslim minorities in
Europe. But it is equally wrongheaded to push under the carpet some
uncomfortable edges of Islam as it meets the liberal-secular order.
So I come to an ambivalent conclusion that may even appear
contradictory. On the one hand, I chided the European Court of
Human Rights for its militant defense of secularism against a hyposta-
tized Islam threat, which only recently has mellowed slightly (above all in
the second Lautsi decision that pairs a sane preference for “culturalized”
Christianity with a properly pluralist acceptance of Islam). On the other
hand, though with the help of inconspicuous sources that all argue from
within an Islamic framework, I depicted Islam as irritation, perhaps even
inimical to liberal secularism, so that the European Court seems to have
got it right after all. Such a summary would dodge the nuance that I
attempted to bring to this mined topic. A principled tension between
Islam and secularism is not the same as an acute threat hic et nunc, which
seems to have inspired the alarmist Islam decisions of the European
Human Rights Court from Dahlab to Dogru. There are moments in
which embattled liberalism is in need of militant defense. But, consid-
ering the vulnerable status of the Muslim minority in European societies
– a minority and not a majority after all – this is not such a moment, not
even (or rather: especially not) after 2001.
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Resume
Un examen attentif de l’idee recxue selon
laquelle la Cour europeenne des droits de
l’homme pratiquerait, en matiere de religion,
un double standard au detriment de l’Islam
conduit a confirmer tout en nuancxant. En
effet une visee de coherence s’affirme dans la
reference de toutes les decisions au plura-
lisme. Mais celui-ci est entendu differem-
ment, pour les chretiens de facxon positive,
pour l’Islam de facxon negative. La compatibilite
de l’Islam avec l’ordre democratique liberal
n’est pas tenu pour acquis. On peut peut-e^tre
apercevoir une sortie du dilemme pluralisme
contre pluralisme dans une decision de 2011
(Lautsi contre Italie).
Mots cles : Laı¨cite ; Religion ; Liberalisme ;
Sociologie du droit ; Islam ; Christianisme ;
Europe.
Zusammenfassung
Die Urteile des Europ€aischen Gerichtshofs
f€ur Menschenrechte (EGMR) €uber chris-
tliche Kreuze und das islamische Kopftuch
werden daraufhin untersucht, ob der unter
(kritischen) Juristen gel€aufige Vorwurf einer
Ungleichbehandlung zugunsten der christli-
chen Religion berechtigt ist. Der Vorwurf
eines „Doppelstandards“ ist tats€achlich nicht
von der Hand zu weisen. Trotzdem sind die
Urteile des EGMR zumindest in einer Hin-
sicht konsistent: sie alle geben vor, den
„Pluralismus“ zu bef€ordern. Nur werden
Christentum und Islam unterschiedlich zum
Pluralismus verortet: als „Best€atigung“ (im
Falle des Christentums) oder als „Gefahr“
(im Falle des Islam). Die Triftigkeit dieser
unterschiedlichen Positionierung von Chris-
tentum und Islam im Hinblick auf „Plural-
ismus“ h€angt davon ab, ob der Islam
tats€achlich mit einer liberal-s€akularen Re-
chtsordnung kompatibel ist. Dar€uber besteht
keine Klarheit, selbst nicht aus islamfreund-
licher Perspektive. Ein m€oglicher Ausweg
aus dem „Pluralismus vs. Pluralismus“ Di-
lemma deutet sich an in dem j€ungsten
Lautsi-Urteil der Grossen Kammer des
EMGR, das eine Pr€aferenz f€ur ein „kultur-
alisiertes“ Christentum mit einem robusten
Minderheitenpluralismus paart.
Schlagw€orter: Laizismus; Religion; Libera-
lismus; Rechtssoziologie; Islam; Christen-
tum; Europa.
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